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Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence on the disagreement among Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) forecasts. In contrast to earlier studies that analyze the
range of FOMC forecasts available in the Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, we
analyze the forecasts made by each individual member of the FOMC from 1992 to 1998.
This newly available dataset, while rich in detail, is short in duration. Even so, we
are able to identify a handful of patterns in the forecasts related to i) forecast hori-
zon; ii) whether the individual is a Federal Reserve Bank president, governor, and/or
Vice Chairman; and iii) whether individual is a voting member of the FOMC. Addi-
tional comparisons are made between forecasts made by the FOMC and the Survey of
Professional Forecasters.
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In 1979, legislation was passed requiring the Federal Reserve to report economic forecasts
to Congress. After an initial release in July of that year, forecasts have been provided in
February and July of each year thereafter.1 Before each of these releases, each member of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) makes a forecast of end-of-year nominal and
real gross domestic product (GDP) growths, ination, and the unemployment rate. The
February forecasts are for the current calendar year. In July, two sets of forecasts are given:
an updated forecast for the current calendar year and a longer-horizon forecast for the next
calendar year. Once these forecasts have been collected from each member of the FOMC,
the maximum, minimum, and a trimmed range (based on dropping the three highest and
three lowest values) of each of the four variables are reported in Monetary Policy Report to
the Congress (MPR).
In this paper, we use a newly available dataset (as described by Romer, 2009) to docu-
ment the disagreement among forecasts made by individual members of the FOMC between
February 1992 and July 1998. Until now, the only publicly available information consisted
of the aggregated information (i.e., the maximum, minimum, and the trimmed range) con-
tained in the MPR. In contrast, this new dataset provides not only the individual forecasts
for each economic variable, but it also associates the forecasts with every member of the
FOMC other than the Chairman.
To date, the dataset is the richest source of information on the FOMC forecasts that
is available to the public. This richness allows us to construct a variety of measures
of disagreement among FOMC members. With these measures in hand, our goal is to
identify any patterns in the disagreement among the forecasts. Examples of potential
patterns include seasonal eects related to the forecast horizon, as well as treatment eects
related to whether the member is a regional bank president, governor, or Vice Chairman, and
whether the individual is a voting member of the FOMC. In addition, we link disagreement
to the accuracy of the forecasts and whether a voting member of the FOMC dissented at
the time of his/her submission to the MPR.
Even so, the dataset is very limited in its duration. Although FOMC forecasts have
been made since 1979, the documentation of the individual forecasts is limited. Under the
guidance of David Small, the Board of Governors has constructed a complete series of the
1Starting in 2008, this process was expanded to include forecasts made in April and October.
1forecasts starting only as far back as February 1992. A complete series of forecasts exists
through the present day, but a 10-year release window has been enacted that limits the
most recent forecasts publicly available. After pruning any individual forecasts missing
one of the four variables of interest, our data consists of a total of 358 individual forecasts
each containing forecasts for the four variables, over three distinct forecast horizons, over a
7-year span, made by each regional bank president and each governor.
We are not the rst to assess forecast disagreement among FOMC members, but the
literature is limited by the lack of availability of the detailed data. Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2003) note that the range of FOMC ination forecasts is positively correlated with
the interquartile range of similar forecasts made in the Livingston Survey. McNees (1995)
notes that the average range of the FOMC forecasts increases with the forecast horizon.
More often than not, the literature on FOMC forecasts has focused on the accuracy and
eciency of the FOMC forecasts (as proxied by the midpoint of either the full or trimmed
range). Examples include Gavin (2003), Gavin and Mandal (2003), and Gavin and Pande
(2008). While not directly related to forecast disagreement, Meade and Sheets (2005) as
well as Chappell and McGregor (2000) discuss the related issue of dissent in the voting
patterns of FOMC members.
Our results dier from all previous in at least two respects. First, we emphasize the
degree of disagreement by each individual member of the FOMC and not the aggregate
level of disagreement. Second, although we discuss disagreement in the context of forecasts
for each of the four variables, we also address forecast disagreement among the vectors of
forecasts themselves. Our logic for doing so is based on an assumption that the FOMC
members construct their vectors of forecasts in a congruent fashion that jointly describes
their view of the economy rather than construct their forecasts irrespective of the other ele-
ments. For example, those who believed in a Phillips curve relationship would likely adjust
their forecasts of ination and unemployment in an inverse fashion as their information set
changes across time.
With these caveats in mind, our main results are as follows. First, there is disagreement
among the members of the FOMC, but the degree of disagreement is small relative to
the degree of disagreement among a universe of forecasters exemplied by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF). Second, the Vice Chairman tends to have the most centrally
located forecasts among all members of the FOMC. Third, while on aggregate there is little
2evidence that the level of disagreement varies with a regional bank's voting status, for some
regional banks disagreement does vary with voting status. In particular, the Cleveland
Federal Reserve Bank tends to be more consensus oriented when voting while the Dallas
Federal Reserve Bank tends to be less consensus oriented when voting. Fourth, both the
Cleveland and St. Louis Feds tend to be in greater disagreement than all other members of
the FOMC. Finally, consumer price index (CPI) forecasts in general seem to be constructed
for reasons other than accuracy as measured by quadratic loss.
This last point is important and should be kept in mind when interpreting our results on
both disagreement and accuracy. As noted by Faust and Wright (2008), the FOMC (and
Greenbook) forecasts are conditional rather than unconditional forecasts. The distinction
between the two types of forecasts is that the conditional forecasts are constructed based on
a hypothetical future path of monetary policy (i.e., a future path of the Federal Funds rate).
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis president James Bullard (2009) makes this distinction
clear when he states that \The FOMC members forecasts are made under appropriate
monetary policy." In this framework, \appropriate monetary policy" is left to the discretion
of the individual FOMC member constructing their own forecast. As argued by Ellison
and Sargent (2009), this induces disagreement among the members irrelevant of whether the
members are working from the same information sets (or even the same baseline models). As
such, our results on disagreement and accuracy capture not only variation in the information
sets and models the FOMC members are working with but also the variation in beliefs on
what appropriate monetary policy should be. Not surprisingly, we nd that this variation
reveals itself most clearly in the forecasts of nominal GDP and ination
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the methods used
for our analysis. In Section 3 we characterize the degree of disagreement among FOMC
forecasts. Section 4 describes the relationship between disagreement and the accuracy of
FOMC forecasts. Section 5 links disagreement with voting dissent at the most recent FOMC
meeting. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Methods
Before presenting our results, we rst provide a brief description of the data and methods
used in our analysis.
32.1 FOMC Data
As described in the introduction, we use the FOMC data provided by Romer (2009).2 The
FOMC data contain forecasts of each of the FOMC members from 1992 to 1998. These
forecasts are made in February and July of each year. The forecasts include annual fourth
quarter to fourth quarter (Q4 to Q4) growth rates of nominal GDP, real GDP, and the CPI
as well as unemployment rate forecasts for the fourth quarter of the relevant year. Forecasts
made in February are for the current calendar year; the forecasts made in July are for both
the current and following calendar year. Thus each year has a total of three forecast sets:
a 10 month-ahead forecast submitted in February, a 5 month-ahead forecast submitted in
July for that year, and a 17 month-ahead forecasts for the next year. The dataset also
contains the name of every FOMC member, aliation (regional bank president, governor,
or Vice Chairman), and whether the individual is a voting member of the FOMC for that
particular year.
Due to the limited time frame of our dataset, we use the term \individual" interchange-
ably with \institution." As a result, our analysis treats each regional bank|not the bank
president themselves|as the smallest unit. Similarly, the Vice Chairman is dened by
the individual's title, not the person. Finally, we treat the governors on average rather
than by person. As a result, between 1992 and 1998 we have 21 individual forecasts for
each regional bank (except Cleveland which has 19 individual forecasts) and 108 individual
forecast for the governor, of which 19 individual forecasts are made by the Vice Chairman.
2.2 SPF Data
To get a general sense of how the FOMC forecasts compare to the universe of professional
forecasters, we also consider disagreement and accuracy of the participants in the SPF as
collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.3 The surveys are released four times
a year: February, May, August, and November. For our disagreement comparisons, we used
data only released in February of each year because for this forecast, the information sets
associated with the SPF are most closely aligned to those of the FOMC members (whereas
the August SPF forecasts are released a full month after the July FOMC forecasts).
The unemployment rate forecast is for the fourth quarter of the current calendar year
2The data set is titled \A New Data Set on Monetary Policy Report: The Economic Forecasts of Individual
Members of the FOMC" and is available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/.
3SPF data can be obtained at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-
professional-forecasters/historical-data/individual-forecasts.cfm.
4while the CPI forecasts are Q4 to Q4 growth rates. In contrast to the FOMC forecasts, the
SPF nominal and real GDP forecasts are in levels. We translate these into Q4 to Q4 growth
rates using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA's) preliminary estimates of nominal and
real GDP for the fourth quarter of the previous year. Calculating the growth rates in this
fashion is possible in real time because the BEA releases these estimates at the end of
January while the SPF forecasts are submitted in mid-February. The only exception is in
1996 when the BEA's estimates of real and nominal GDP for 1995:Q4 were rst released
on February 23 instead of at the end of January. We assume the SPF forecasters used this
BEA's release in the February survey to calculate growth and ination rates in 1996.
2.3 Methods
A measure of dispersion must be chosen to evaluate disagreement among the FOMC fore-
casts. In choosing a metric, our rst goal was to select one that was internally consistent
regardless of the dimension of the forecast|that is, choose a metric that was not only well
dened when analyzing the level of disagreement for each of the four individual variables
but was also well dened when evaluating the level of disagreement among the vector-
valued forecasts themselves. Our second goal was to choose a metric that accounted for
any correlations across the individual variables when we measured the multivariate level of
disagreement.
Figure 1 shows why this second point is a concern. Here we simulated 18 distinct
bivariate standard normals with a correlation coecient of 0:9. As expected, the pairs
essentially lie along a line through the origin with slope equal to 0:9. Now consider points
A, B, C, and D on the circle centered at the origin. Because each of these four points is
equidistant from the origin, if we used Euclidean distance, they might be considered to be
equally in \disagreement." In contrast, if one adjusts for the fact that the two variables are
correlated, it is clear that points A and C are in greater \disagreement" with the bivariate
sample as a whole than points B and D. In our four-variate sample of forecasts, we expect
such an issue to arise since, for example, in so far as CPI-based ination is highly correlated
with GDP deator-based ination, a coherent forecast would roughly satisfy the property
that the growth of nominal GDP would be the sum of the growth rate in real GDP and
ination.
The Mahalanobis distance satises each of our two requirements and is our baseline
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t; is the sample standard deviation of the forecasts.4
At some level we have tied our hands by wanting our measure of distance to be applicable
for both multivariate and univariate comparisons. Were we to focus exclusively on the scalar
case, we could have chosen the interquartile range as used in Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers
(2003) and Capistr an and Timmermann (2008). Instead, as a check of the robustness of our
results, we also consider a variant of absolute deviations from the median as our measure
of distance.
First consider the scalar case. If we let m
(j)
t; denote the median forecast at time t for
horizon , then a simple outlier-robust measure of distance for individual i is the absolute
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The multivariate case is more dicult. The rst complication is that while it is simple to
generalize from the sample mean of scalars to a sample average of vectors, it is signicantly
more complex to generalize from a median of scalars to a median of vectors. A second
complication is that the concept of MAD is an inherently scalar concept which, when
constructed element by element, does not account for the correlations across the variables
as discussed relative to Figure 1.
4Lahiri and Sheng (2008) also use squared deviations from the mean to measure disagreement.
6Fortunately, a multivariate concept of a median does exist. The Tukey median of a
collection of vectors is dened as the point within the cloud formed by the sample of vectors
that has the greatest ldepth. Here we eschew a detailed discussion of ldepth and Tukey
medians but instead provide an analogy using the scalar case.5 Consider a collection of
points on a line and begin with the left-most point. If we draw a vertical line through that
point, the ldepth associated with that point is the minimum of (i) the number of points on,
or to, its left and (ii) the number of points on, or to it's right. Since this number is 1 that
point has an ldepth of 1. Now we repeat this process for every point in the sample. If
there is a point with a unique largest ldepth, it is the median. If the point is not unique,
then the median can be any point on or between those two points. In the multivariate case,
the algorithm is similar but instead of drawing lines through points, we draw half-spaces.
Throughout, we use the publicly available Fortran code provided by Struyf and Rousseeuw
(1998) to calculate the Tukey median.6
Given this multivariate measure of central tendency, we now generalize the concept of
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In this section we present the aggregate level of disagreement among the forecasters and
attempt to discern any patterns in the degree of disagreement by the individual members of
the FOMC. In each instance, we begin with an overview focused on the disagreement among
the vector-valued forecasts. We then provide some discussion on disagreement related to
the individual elements of the forecasts. Given our very limited data, we do not pursue
identifying treatment eects using the panel data methods proposed by Davies and Lahiri
5See Rousseeuw and Struyf (1998) for a detailed discussion of the Tukey median.
6ftp://ftp.win.ua.ac.be/pub/software/agoras/newles/ldeptha.gz
7(1995) or Lahiri and Sheng (2008). Instead we use HAC-robust t-tests of equal means
between the relevant groups.
Figure 2 provides the sample paths of aggregate disagreement among the FOMC fore-
casts using the square root of the determinant of St; as the relevant metric. The plot
consists of three lines, one for each of the forecast horizons. There is little clear evidence
of any patterns among the lines, but one could certainly argue that in aggregate, forecast
disagreement is lowest at the shortest (5-month ahead) forecast horizon.
Figure 3 provides the same plots of disagreement but subdivided by element (and hence
the plots are of st;). In most cases, there is little clear evidence of any patterns among the
lines. But again, there is some indication that forecast disagreement is lowest at the shortest
forecast horizon. This is particularly true for the CPI forecasts for which the degree of
disagreement is monotone increasing in the forecast horizon at every forecast origin. Recall
that McNees (1995) documents that the average range of the FOMC forecasts is increasing
in the forecast horizon.
This is a somewhat surprising result since, when using standard OLS regression methods
for constructing forecasts, all forecasts are expected to eventually converge to the (histor-
ical) sample mean. Hence, regardless of whether the \models" used by members of the
FOMC are dierent, eventually one would expect the forecasts to disagree less. Our con-
trasting observation (again, especially for CPI ination) suggests that the forecasts are
not being constructed in a minimum mean square error (MSE) sense but are being con-
structed for other reasons.7 While other statistical loss functions could explain this result
(e.g. Capistr an and Timmermann, 2008), Ellison and Sargent (2009) argue that the FOMC
members are being strategic when putting their forecasts together. In particular, in the
context of a model of robust decision making, they argue that the forecasts are a strategic
tool for convincing the other members of their policy view. As such, the members have
incentives to (say) raise their ination forecasts if they think policy should be tighter or
lower their ination forecasts if they think policy should be looser|regardless of what they
think the actual level of ination will truly be.
If there are horizon-driven disagreement eects, and we admit they are dicult to iden-
tify given our limited dataset, they will have to be accounted for when we try to identify
7This observation also lends some criticism to Romer and Romer's (2008) suggestions that the FOMC
forecasts would be more \accurate" if they were to adapt the Greenbook forecasts instead of their own.
Such a suggestion presumes that the Board of governors sta has the same loss function as the members of
the FOMC.
8other treatment eects. Fortunately, our baseline measure of disagreement D(xi;t;), at
least in part, mitigates the issue by rescaling the nominal distances separately for each time
period. To see whether the rescaling does in fact remove all horizon-based eects, in Table
1 we report the mean levels of disagreement for each horizon at both the multivariate level
and individually for each of the four variables. In each case, a simple t-test of equal means
among the three horizons fails to reject the null of equal disagreement. As such, we proceed
with our analysis treating the normalized distance measures as having fully accounted for
the horizon eects.
3.1 Voting Status
Table 2 provides the mean levels of disagreement by horizon and across all horizons for
voting and non-voting members of the FOMC. Columns 2 and 3 are the values including
all members of the FOMC. In each instance, there is no statistically signicant dierence in
the level of disagreement based on voting status. In column 4 we make the same comparison
but exclude the New York Fed and the governors from the analysis because they always
vote. In broad terms, the results are unchanged, though in one instance we nd that for
real GDP forecasts at the 10-month ahead horizon, the regional banks tend to have a greater
level of disagreement when they are not voting than when they are voting. Even so, there
are 40 t-tests in Table 2 and even if the null hypothesis held in each case, we would expect
some spurious rejections simply due to multiple testing.
3.2 Regional Bank and Governor
Tables 3 and 4 decompose the mean levels of disagreement to a ner level. In column 1
of both tables, each regional bank, governor, or Vice Chairman is listed. Associated with
these FOMC participants, the second column provides the average level of disagreement
at the multivariate level in Table 3 and by individual variable in Table 4. The third and
fourth columns further distinguish the level by voting status. The remaining three columns
provide p-values associated with simple t-tests for equal means for comparisons based on
voting status, comparisons with the governors, and comparisons with the Vice Chairman.
We begin by simply noting the biggest and smallest values of average disagreement. At
the multivariate level, the Cleveland Fed has a high level of disagreement with the other
FOMC members, but the St. Louis Fed has|by a substantial margin|the highest level
of disagreement. In contrast, the Vice Chairman exhibits the lowest level of disagreement
9among the FOMC members. Column 7 of Table 3 formally tests whether the individuals
exhibit signicantly dierent mean levels of disagreement from the Vice Chairman. We
reject the null of equal disagreement between the Vice Chairman and the overall group
with a p-value of 2.3%. We also reject the null of equal disagreement between the Vice
Chairman and both the Cleveland and St. Louis Feds individually. Interestingly, we also
reject the null when comparing the average among the other governors with that of the Vice
Chairman. Strengthening the argument that the Cleveland and St. Louis Feds forecasts are
outliers is the comparison, made in column 6, between the regional banks and the governors
as a whole. Again we nd that only the St. Louis and Cleveland Feds exhibit signicantly
dierent levels of mean disagreement. This is despite the fact that, as seen in column 2, the
mean degree of disagreement by the governors is the fourth highest behind only Cleveland,
Minneapolis, and St. Louis!
Continuing with the multivariate comparisons in Table 3, in column 5 we provide p-
values associated with a t-test for equal mean disagreement based on the voting status for
each regional bank (except New York, which always has a vote). Cleveland, Dallas, and to a
lesser extent Minneapolis and Philadelphia, seem to exhibit dierent levels of disagreement
based on their voting status. Whereas the Dallas Fed seems to be in greater disagreement
when voting, the Cleveland Fed seems to be more consensus oriented when voting. That
said, the Cleveland Fed should by no means be seen as a consensus builder. When voting
they still have the third-highest level of disagreement behind only the Dallas and St. Louis
Feds. It is also interesting to note that we fail to reject the null that the St. Louis Fed
varies its level of disagreement by voting status. The implication is that the St. Louis Fed
has arguably the highest degree of disagreement among the FOMC members regardless of
its voting status.
In each panel of Table 4, the same comparisons are made but decomposed into nominal
and real GDP growths, CPI ination, and the unemployment rate. In each case, the
St. Louis Fed has one of the two highest values of mean disagreement. Moreover, when
comparing these values with those of the Vice Chairman or the governors as a whole, we
reject the null of equal mean disagreement 7 of 8 instances at the 10% level.
Looking across the four panels, it appears that there is a wider range of degrees of
disagreement on the nominal side than on the real side. In the panels associated with real
GDP growth and the unemployment rate, only 2 of 26 tests have statistically signicant
10dierences in mean disagreement between the Vice Chairman and either the regional banks
or other governors. Moreover, there are only 3 of 24 instances between both panels in which
a regional bank has signicantly dierent levels of mean disagreement from the governors. If
we exclude the St. Louis Fed from our tally, there would be no signicant dierence between
the disagreement in the Vice Chairman and other regional banks or other governors and
only two signicant dierences in disagreement between the governors and a regional bank.
This is in contrast to the results in the panels associated with nominal GDP growth
and ination. Here we nd that the Cleveland, Minneapolis, and St. Louis Feds, and to
a lesser extent the governors, exhibit statistically signicant dierent degrees of disagree-
ment with the Vice Chairman. Moreover, these and several other regional banks exhibit
signicant levels of dierences in disagreement with the governors. Among these instances,
the Minneapolis, Cleveland, and St. Louis Feds exhibit greater disagreement while the
Atlanta, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Chicago Feds exhibit less disagreement than the
governors.
When separated by voting status, there are a few instances of statistically signicant
dierences in the level of disagreement. Richmond, Cleveland and the Minneapolis Feds
appear to become more consensus-oriented in their ination forecasts when voting, whereas
Chicago appears less consensus-oriented when voting. And while the Philadelphia Fed
seems to be more consensus-oriented with their unemployment forecasts when voting, the
Richmond Fed tends to exhibit greater disagreement when voting|we reject the null of
equal disagreement with p-value of 1.6%. Interestingly, while at the multivariate level the
Dallas Fed exhibits a signicant increase in disagreement when voting, it does not exhibit
any signicant dierences in any one of the individual subcases. This is also marginally
the case for Philadelphia Fed in which it exhibits signicant decrease in disagreement at
the multivariate level with a p-value of 10.5% when voting even though three out of four
times its voting pattern did not change in the scalar case|thus highlighting our view that
multivariate comparisons of disagreement provide additional information not contained in
any of the scalar cases.
3.3 Relative to the SPF
In this section we look at disagreement among the FOMC members but couched in a larger
world of forecasts made by other professional forecasters. Specically, we imbed the SPF
forecasts with those made by the FOMC for each February forecast. We restrict attention
11to these forecasts because the information sets, while not perfectly timed, are signicantly
better timed than those associated with the July forecasts. By doing so we add 216 more
individual-year observations to the population of forecasts made in February.
The purpose of this exercise is to get a feel for whether or not the degree of disagreement
among the FOMC members is \large" or \small." In order to reach such a conclusion, we
need other forecasts to serve as a baseline and the SPF is a well known and timely collection
of publicly available forecasts. Even so, we admit that there is a sense in which we are
mixing apples and oranges: The FOMC forecasts are conditional while those from the SPF
are unconditional.
With this caveat in mind, Figure 4 provides a box-and-whisker plot of each individual's
measure of vector-valued disagreement. The red asterisks denote disagreements associated
with the SPF while the blue circles are those associated with the FOMC members. One
immediately notices that the dots associated with the FOMC are on the left side of the plot
while the SPF's asterisks are more likely to be on the right side and hence, at least visually,
it appears that members of the SPF exhibit far higher levels of disagreement than members
of the FOMC.8 For the sake of comparison, we also include the levels of disagreement
based on the Greenbook forecasts associated with the January FOMC meeting. The green
squares associated with these forecasts appear to be centrally located relative to the FOMC
and SPF forecasts.
Table 5 provides the detailed measures of disagreement among the SPF, the FOMC
members, and the various subgroups of the FOMC in our analysis. As noted in Figure 4,
the most obvious result is simply that the degree of disagreement among the SPF is much
larger than any disagreement among the FOMC and any of its subgroups. Though not
reported here, all t-tests for equal mean disagreement between the SPF and members of the
FOMC (i.e., SPF vs. FOMC, SPF vs. Voters) are statistically signicant at a very high
level. Also not reported, when the FOMC is couched in this larger universe of forecasters,
we nd no evidence of statistically signicant levels of disagreement among the FOMC
members|a result driven by the fact that any disagreement among the FOMC members is
swamped by the aggregate degree of disagreement including that from the SPF.
8In this plot, there is no substance to the vertical axis. The \height" associated with any point is chosen
at random simply to prevent the dots from piling on top of one another in the graph.
123.4 Robustness
One criticism of our results is that our preferred measure of disagreement is fundamentally
based on means rather than medians, and hence outliers may be unduly inuencing the
measure of central tendency from which we base the degree of disagreement. As noted
previously, we replicated the results in Tables 1 through 5 using medians as the outlier-
robust measure of central tendency and used MAD as the outlier-robust measure of a
\typical" distance (these tables are available on request).
Although the nominal measurements of disagreement are very dierent across the two
metrics, in most instances our characterizations of \signicant" outliers are unchanged.
The outlier-robust variant of Table 2 fails to reject the null of voter status eects among
the regional banks in each instance except for the very same one case relating to real GDP
growth at the 10-month horizon. The outlier-robust variants of Table 3 and 4 are slightly
less similar but still very highly correlated. Of the 9 instances in which Table 3 reports
a p-value less than 10%, the outlier-robust variant matches 7 times. The remaining few
instances indicate some dierences relating to the metric. The mean-based metric nds
that at the multivariate level, Cleveland, Dallas, and Philadelphia show dierent degrees
of disagreement when voting than when not voting while the median-based metric fails to
reject the null of equal level of disagreement when voting or not. The outlier-robust variant
of Table 4 has a similar rate of success matching with Table 4: 22 of 28 times. Of these
that do not match, many dier by basis points around the 10% threshold.
When we imbed the SPF with the FOMC members, an outlier-robust variant of Table 5
continues to show the same patterns. The SPF has a much higher degree of disagreement
than the FOMC members. Tests of equal disagreement between the SPF and the FOMC
members are highly signicant. Again, in the greater universe of forecasting agents, we fail
to reject the null of equal disagreement among the FOMC subgroups.
To be fair, we should make clear that we are not interpreting the similarity of results
as support of our main conclusions. Rather, we interpret the similarity as at least not
contrasting with our observations using the means-based metric. Our caution stems from
some dissimilarities between Table 1 and its outlier-robust variant. Recall that in Table 1
we fail to reject the null of any remaining seasonal eects induced by horizon after scaling.
In contrast, the outlier-robust variant still nds strong evidence of horizon-based eects in
average disagreement at the 5-month horizon for both real GDP growth and CPI ination.
13That is, we reject the null of equal disagreement for the 10-month vs: 5-month and 17-month
vs: 5-month comparisons for both real GDP and CPI.
4 Accuracy and Disagreement
In this section we describe the accuracy of the forecasts provided by the FOMC with an eye
toward any linkages with disagreement. For each of the individual members of the FOMC
this is straightforward because we have the actual forecasts. For the FOMC in aggregate,
recall that there is no single \forecast" reported in the MPR; the MPR reports only the
range and trimmed range. While others have chosen to use the midpoint of the range or
the trimmed range as the FOMC \forecast," we use the trimmed mean constructed as the
simple average of the sample after dropping the three highest and three lowest values of
the variable. Finally, although other loss functions could be used to characterize forecast
accuracy (Capistr an and Timmermann, 2008) we restrict attention to the most commonly
used quadratic loss function noting, however, that there is no evidence suggesting that the
members of the FOMC construct their forecasts with this loss function in mind.
4.1 The Trimmed Mean Forecast
Before presenting our results on the accuracy of the forecasts it is useful to take a closer
look at how disagreement aects the behavior of the trimmed mean forecast. Since this
forecast is constructed by rst dropping the three lowest and three highest forecasts of that
variable and then taking the simple average of the remaining forecasts, by denition this
implies that individuals with greater degrees of disagreement are less likely to have their
forecasts explicitly incorporated in the trimmed mean forecast.
In Table 6, for each regional bank, Vice Chairman, and the governors as a group we
provide the percentage of forecasts excluded from the trimmed mean forecast for each vari-
able. Panel A shows all horizons while in the remaining panels this exclusion is subdivided
by each of the three forecast horizons.9;10 Not surprisingly given our previous results on
disagreement among the FOMC, in columns 2 through 5 of Panel A we nd that, averaging
9For the regional banks and the Vice Chairman there are a maximum of 21 forecasts, with a maximum
of 7 for each horizon. For the governors the maximum is larger because we aggregate across all of the
governors.
10In some instances there is a tie for the third-highest or third-lowest value of the forecast. While it is
irrelevant which value is dropped for the nominal value of the trimmed mean forecasts it does aect our
percentages of times a value was dropped by individual. When a tie exists, we randomize among the choices
using equal weights across the individuals. As such, these percentages should be viewed as approximations.
14across all horizons, the St. Louis Fed had its forecast dropped from the trimmed mean
either the most or second most often for each of the four variables. In fact, the St. Louis
Fed forecast is dropped more than half of the time for each variable and is dropped roughly
86% of the time for the nominal GDP growth forecast. Moreover, at the 17-month horizon
the nominal GDP growth forecast is dropped from the trimmed mean 100% of the time!
Note, however, that since this is done variable by variable, some individual members
of the FOMC do have their forecast explicitly incorporated into (say) the trimmed mean
nominal GDP growth forecast but not the trimmed mean CPI ination forecast. But if the
vector-valued forecasts are constructed in the congruent fashion we expect them to be (that
is, taking account of the linkages across the variables), there is a sense in which the vector of
trimmed mean forecasts is still including forecasts from individuals who are \multivariate
outliers." For example, consider the St. Louis Fed 17-month ahead forecasts. While
it is true that their nominal GDP growth forecasts are always excluded, at times the real
GDP growth, CPI ination, and unemployment forecasts are included in the trimmed mean
despite the fact that the St. Louis Fed forecast as a whole has an outlier mentality relative
to the majority of the FOMC.
In the nal column of each panel we therefore consider a slightly dierent approach
to constructing the trimmed mean forecasts that is based on our multivariate measure of
disagreement. Specically, for each time period and horizon, we construct the measure
of disagreement for each vector-valued forecast and \trim" those with the 6 largest levels
of disagreement|analogous to the present approach that drops the 3 largest and smallest
values of the forecast. This approach omits those forecasts that, considered as a vector,
are least in agreement with the FOMC as a whole. Using this trimming rule, over all the
horizons, in panel A we see that the St. Louis Fed is dropped more than 80% of the time
and at the 17-month horizon it is dropped 100% of the time. In contrast, the Atlanta and
Richmond Feds are rarely dropped; in fact, at the 17-month horizon they never are.
4.2 Mean Square Errors
We now proceed to documenting the accuracy of the FOMC forecasts. In our approach
we calculate the mean square errors (MSEs) associated with each of the regional banks, the
Vice Chairman, and the governors separately for each forecast horizon and for each of the
four variables. In addition, we evaluate the accuracy of the trimmed mean forecast as our
proxy for the FOMC forecast as reported in the MPR. For comparison we also report a few
15other forecasts that could have been constructed using the forecasts from the FOMC: the
equally weighted average of the forecasts without trimming, the equally weighted average
formed using those forecasts that were trimmed (i.e., the average of the highest 3 and lowest
3 forecasts), and the trimmed mean forecast using the concept of multivariate trimming
considered in the previous section. As a further source of comparison, we also include the
forecast associated with the median of the SPF and the Greenbook forecasts.
Table 7 reports these MSEs. Specically, the rst row provides the MSEs of the trimmed
mean forecasts by variable and horizon. The remaining elements of the rows provide the
ratio of the MSEs for that row relative to that for the trimmed mean. A number smaller
(larger) than 1 indicates that the individual associated with the row was on average more
(less) accurate than the trimmed mean forecast. Before proceeding, we should note that
due to the extremely small sample sizes in each of the cells (which are typically based on
7 observations) we make no attempts to test for statistical signicance across the MSEs by
group. Whereas we felt that our normalizations removed the \horizon-based" eects in
our analysis of disagreement (and hence we were willing to aggregate across horizons after
normalizing), we feel much less comfortable doing so when measuring accuracy. As such,
all of our observations should be interpreted keeping the small sample sizes in mind.
With that caveat, we begin by rst noting that in nearly all cases, the MSEs of the
forecasts decreases as the event horizon shrinks. For example, the trimmed mean forecast of
nominal GDP growth has MSEs of 1.187, 0.929, and 0.211 for the 17-month, 10-month and 5-
month horizons respectively. In general, the trimmed mean forecast tends to perform better
than the individual members in terms of MSE|and even more so for nominal GDP growth
and ination than for real GDP growth and unemployment. For the nominal variables,
the trimmed mean is better than 9 to 10 of the individuals at each horizon. Only the
Philadelphia and Richmond Feds produce forecasts of the nominal variables that are more
accurate than the trimmed mean for more than half the horizons. But for the real variables,
the trimmed mean does better than only 6 to 9 of the individuals. Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas,
Minneapolis, Richmond, and St. Louis each are more accurate than the trimmed mean for
more than half the horizons. Overall, the New York and San Francisco Feds were least
likely (on average) to be more accurate than the trimmed mean, outperforming it only
once and twice, respectively. In contrast, the Richmond and Philadelphia Feds were more
accurate than the trimmed mean 9 and 8 times, respectively. Interestingly, the governors
16and Vice Chairman were among the worst forecasters relative to the trimmed mean with
one very notable exception: They nearly always did better forecasting ination.
The bottom portion of each panel reports MSEs for the SPF, Greenbook, and some al-
ternative model averaging{type forecasts that could have been constructed with the FOMC
forecasts. In 9 of 12 comparisons, the simple average of the FOMC forecasts has a lower
MSE than the trimmed mean forecast|though, admittedly, in most instances the relative
gains in accuracy are small. Our alternative trimmed forecast, based on trimming vectors
as a whole, had a lower MSE in 8 of 12 comparisons relative to the trimmed mean. In
those instances where it did worse, the relative losses were very small but in some of those
instances in which it did better, the gains were a substantial 10% or more.
Amusingly, in 9 of 12 instances, the simple average of the forecasts that were \trimmed"
by the FOMC did better than the trimmed mean forecast itself. And as was the case for
our multivariate trimmed forecast, when it did worse, the relative losses were small while
in instances where it did better, the gains were 10% and even 20%.
4.3 Linking Disagreement and Accuracy
Here we attempt to identify any empirical connections between disagreement and accuracy.
Our approach is partially motivated by Lahiri and Sheng (2009) who provide a theoretical
link between disagreement among forecasters and aggregate forecast uncertainty. To do so,
rst let ^ u
(j)2
i;t; denote the squared forecast error of variable j, associated with forecasts made
at time t, with horizon , made by individual i. If we then let D(x
(j0)
i;t;) denote an individual's
level of disagreement on variable j0, and let RB and V denote dummy variables for regional
bank and voting respectively, we estimate the following pooled regression (pooled across i
and t) separately for each variable j, j0, and horizon :
^ u
(j)2
i;t; = 1Vi;t + 2RBi + 3Vi;t  RBi + D(x
(j0)
i;t;)(1Vi;t + 2RBi + 3Vi;t  RBi) + i;t;:
The rst three predictors|those associated with the 's|are controls. The latter three
predictors|those associated with the 's|are the ones on which we focus our attention.
We use these predictors to parse out any eects the level of disagreement may have on the
accuracy of the forecasts. In particular, the goal is to identify any disagreement eects
driven by whether that individual is a governor (H0 : 1 = 0), voting regional bank president
(H0 : 1 + 2 + 3 = 0), or non-voting regional bank president (H0 : 2 = 0).
17Table 8 reports the results of the pooled regressions linking the accuracy of CPI ination
forecasts to disagreement among either CPI ination forecasts (columns 2, 4, and 6) or
nominal GDP growth forecasts (columns 3, 5, and 7). We nd no signicant evidence
that the degree of disagreement by the governors aects the accuracy of their forecasts
(i.e., 1 = 0) at any horizon. Similarly, in the bottom panel we nd no evidence that the
degree of disagreement by voting regional banks aects the accuracy of their forecasts (i.e.,
1+2+3 = 0). This, in turn, is supported by no evidence of dierences in disagreement
eects between the governors and the voting regional banks (i.e., 1   (1 + 2 + 3) = 0).
However, at the two longest horizons|those most associated with policy decisions|
the level of disagreement on nominal variables among non-voting members of the regional
banks has a negative impact on the accuracy of their corresponding ination forecasts (i.e.,
2 > 0). This is reinforced in the bottom panel by the fact that for these same horizons
we nd a signicant dierence in the eect of disagreement by governors and non-voting
regional banks (i.e., 1   2 < 0) with p-values all less than 10%. We also witness some
signicant dierences in disagreement between voting and non-voting regional bank (i.e.,
1 + 2 + 3   [2] < 0).
In contrast, in unreported results, we nd little evidence of any relationship between
disagreement among forecasts of real variables and the accuracy of CPI ination forecasts.
In addition, we nd little evidence of any measure of disagreement and the accuracy of
forecasts of real GDP growth, unemployment, and nominal GDP growth. This lack of
signicance supports the notion that the CPI ination forecasts play a special role among
the FOMC members above and beyond simply being a forecast of an unknown future event.
While we can only conjecture what this role may be, one interpretation is that as a non-
voting member of the FOMC, these regional banks are regularly reporting their ination
(and nominal GDP growth) forecasts not so much as an indicator of what they expect future
values of ination to be but as a worst-case scenario (Ellison and Sargent, 2009) designed
to inuence the present voting members of their view of monetary policy.
5 Dissent and Disagreement
This section briey looks at whether an individual's level of disagreement is related to
whether that individual casts a dissenting vote at the corresponding FOMC meeting. Un-
fortunately, trying to make such a connection is seriously limited by the available data. For
18example, not only do we have data that span a mere 7 years, our forecasts are associated
only with the February and July FOMC meetings, which are only a portion of the FOMC
meetings in a given year. Making the situation even harder is the fact that during the time
frame for which we have data, not a single voting member of the FOMC dissented in any
of the February meetings.
For the July meetings, there were a total of 7 dissenting votes cast, among a total of 143
votes. To see if these dissenting votes are related to an individual's forecast disagreement,
Table 9 reports the mean levels of disagreement among voters based on whether the member
dissented. The top panel contains the results for disagreement among the 17-month ahead
forecasts and the lower panel contains those for the 5-month ahead forecasts. In each,
the rst row is related to vector-valued disagreement while the remaining rows relate to
disagreement for the individual forecasts.
A quick look at columns 2 and 3 indicates that in most cases, disagreement was on
average higher among those who cast dissenting votes. This is particularly true at the
shorter time horizon. Columns 5 reports p-values associated with t-tests of equal mean
disagreement between those who did not dissent and those who dissented. Column 6 does
the same but between non-voters and dissenters. Given our very small sample sizes, there
is very little evidence of statistically signicant dierences in mean disagreement among
these groups.
6 Conclusion
Using a novel dataset, we characterize the degree of disagreement and accuracy of the FOMC
forecasts used in the Monetary Policy Report to Congress. While the time duration of the
dataset is very limited, we feel that a handful of patterns related to the forecast horizon,
related to whether the member is a regional bank president, governor, or Vice Chairman,
and whether the individual is a voting member of the FOMC are fairly clear.
Although it is dicult to parse out explicitly from our limited dataset, we believe that
underlying many of our results is the fact that, as noted by Bullard (2009) as well as Ellison
and Sargent (2009), the members of the FOMC construct their forecasts for reasons other
than accuracy as measured by MSEs. Since we most clearly observe this in the CPI-based
ination forecasts one can infer that is where the battle lines were typically drawn over
19the time frame of our dataset.11 Reinforcing that argument is the empirical observation
that it is the nominal variables for which there are the most signicant deviations in mean
disagreement between the regional banks and the Vice Chairman, whom we nd to be one
of the most consensus-oriented members of the FOMC.
11In other words, there is a reason the terms \ination hawk" and \ination dove" are common decriptions
of FOMC members. Put dierently, one never hears a member of the FOMC described as an \unemployment
hawk" or \unemployment dove."
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22Figure 1: Bivariate Disagreement
Note:
(i) Data were generated as bivariate N(0,1) with correlation 0.90. The Euclidean
distance from the mean for points A,B,C and D are all 1.41 whereas the estimates
of the Mahalanobis distances for those points are 5.59, 1.23, 5.59, and 1.23,
respectively.
23Figure 2: FOMC Multivariate Disagreement
Note:
(i) The lines consist of seven points. Each point is the square root of the determi-
nant of the sample covariance of the vectors of forecasts.
24Figure 3: FOMC Scalar Disagreement
Notes:
(i) The lines consist of 7 points. Each point is the sample standard deviation of the
scalar forecasts.
25Figure 4: Multivariate Disagreement of FOMC and SPF
Notes:
(i) Values are calculated using equation (1). Box corresponds to the interquartile range (IQR). The mean is
represented by the vertical line in the box. The whisker on the left(right) is 1.5 times less(more) than the IQR.
Observations beyond the whiskers are considered outliers.
(ii) In this plot, there is no substance to the vertical axis. The \height" associated with any point is chosen at
random simply to prevent the dots from piling on top of one another in the graph.
26Table 1: Mean Disagreement by Horizon
Mean p-value
17-month 10-month 5-month 17m vs. 10m 10m vs. 5m 17m vs. 5m
Vector 1.840 1.844 1.832 0.962 0.885 0.927
NGDP 0.772 0.801 0.767 0.721 0.671 0.947
RGDP 0.750 0.780 0.744 0.705 0.647 0.948
CPI 0.736 0.734 0.807 0.983 0.362 0.409
UNEMP 0.784 0.753 0.758 0.698 0.950 0.738
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(ii) Mean multivariate disagreement is calculated by averaging over all individuals' level of disagreement using
equation (1). The scalar measures of disagreement were constructed similarly using equation (2).
27Table 2: Mean Disagreement by Voting Status
Mean p-value
Voters excl.
Voters Voters vs. NY/G vs.
Voters Nonvoters excl. NY/G Nonvoters Nonvoters
Vector
17-month 1.822 1.867 1.823 0.684 0:715
10-month 1.855 1.828 1.896 0.815 0:606
5-month 1.771 1.922 1.725 0.197 0:179
Total 1.816 1.872 1.816 0.395 0:461
Nominal GDP
17-month 0.722 0.847 0.772 0.244 0:571
10-month 0.793 0.812 0.833 0.861 0:874
5-month 0.745 0.799 0.830 0.574 0:819
Total 0.753 0.820 0.812 0.272 0:917
Real GDP
17-month 0.698 0.827 0.633 0.270 0:163
10-month 0.841 0.688 0.975 0.145 0:031
5-month 0.709 0.797 0.688 0.446 0:467
Total 0.750 0.771 0.768 0.747 0:974
CPI
17-month 0.745 0.724 0.884 0.862 0:281
10-month 0.688 0.804 0.704 0.334 0:480
5-month 0.812 0.800 0.853 0.910 0:653
Total 0.748 0.776 0.812 0.673 0:645
Unemployment
17-month 0.773 0.799 0.765 0.786 0:779
10-month 0.792 0.694 0.648 0.391 0:709
5-month 0.750 0.770 0.709 0.863 0:674
Total 0.772 0.755 0.706 0.790 0:516
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively.
(ii) Mean multivariate disagreement is calculated by averaging over all individuals' level
of disagreement using equation (1). The scalar measures of disagreement were con-
structed similarly using equation (2).
28Table 3: Mean Multivariate Disagreement by Individual
Mean p-value
Voter vs. Agg. Agg. vs.
Aggregate Voters Non-voters Non-voters vs. Gov. Vice-chair
Atlanta 1.613 1.370 1.710 0:215 0:148 0:837
Boston 1.721 1.681 1.751 0:703 0:485 0:421
Chicago 1.820 1.806 1.831 0:911 0:983 0:172
Cleveland 2.176 1.936 2.589 0:017 0:019 0:002
Dallas 1.726 2.173 1.503 0:010 0:525 0:418
Kansas City 1.766 1.668 1.839 0:584 0:670 0:269
Minneapolis 1.834 1.468 1.980 0:053 0:947 0:176
New York 1.780 1.780 0:809 0:329
Philadelphia 1.780 1.511 1.887 0:105 0:764 0:260
Richmond 1.720 1.676 1.737 0:801 0:434 0:393
San Francisco 1.727 1.727 1.727 0:999 0:462 0:370
St Louis 2.512 2.555 2.480 0:699 0:000 0:000
Governor 1.823 1.823 0:033
Vice-chair 1.577 1.577
Total 1.839 1.816 1.872 0:461 0:781 0:023
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 5: Mean Disagreement of SPF and FOMC
SPF FOMC Voters Nonvoters Regional Governors
Vector 2.000 1.272 1.281 1.257 1.255 1.311
NGDP 0.845 0.549 0.550 0.548 0.522 0.612
RGDP 0.787 0.446 0.485 0.387 0.430 0.483
CPI 0.826 0.620 0.568 0.697 0.640 0.571
UNEMP 0.889 0.495 0.524 0.452 0.476 0.541
Notes:
(i) Mean multivariate disagreement is calculated by averaging over all individuals' level of
disagreement using equation (1). The scalar measures of disagreement were constructed

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 7: Forecast Accuracy by Variable
17-month 10-month 5-month
NGDP
Trimmed Mean 1.187 0.929 0.211
Atlanta 1.308 1.033 1.307
Boston 1.568 0.683 1.872
Chicago 1.045 0.969 0.754
Cleveland 1.325 1.405 2.712
Dallas 0.705 1.073 1.377
Kansas City 1.326 1.210 0.789
Minneapolis 0.889 1.211 0.576
New York 0.894 1.000 1.584
Philadelphia 0.747 0.993 1.107
Richmond 0.940 0.857 0.880
San Francisco 1.221 1.281 1.836
St Louis 1.780 1.558 2.646
Governor 1.072 1.566 1.363
Vicechair 1.044 1.718 0.953
Untrimmed Mean 0.962 0.980 0.922
Mean of Trimmed 0.908 0.978 0.812
Vect Trimmed Mean 0.976 0.889 0.972
Greenbook 1.432 1.076 1.664
SPF 0.911
RGDP
Trimmed Mean 2.201 1.535 0.574
Atlanta 0.956 0.891 1.353
Boston 1.442 0.965 1.362
Chicago 1.004 0.878 0.896
Cleveland 0.799 1.064 1.929
Dallas 0.722 0.861 0.868
Kansas City 1.091 1.483 1.067
Minneapolis 0.795 0.677 0.680
New York 1.206 1.160 1.397
Philadelphia 0.674 1.046 0.891
Richmond 1.085 0.728 0.778
San Francisco 1.279 1.151 1.024
St Louis 0.834 0.773 0.722
Governor 1.009 1.253 1.001
Vicechair 0.972 1.628 1.181
Untrimmed Mean 0.997 0.992 0.964
Mean of Trimmed 0.995 0.982 0.909
Vect Trimmed Mean 0.999 0.951 1.041




Trimmed Mean 0.509 0.240 0.134
Atlanta 1.235 1.125 0.968
Boston 1.055 1.232 1.667
Chicago 1.131 1.453 1.053
Cleveland 0.704 1.124 0.983
Dallas 1.645 1.048 1.446
Kansas City 1.145 0.905 1.032
Minneapolis 1.490 3.024 1.606
New York 1.241 1.279 1.071
Philadelphia 0.763 0.726 0.978
Richmond 0.988 1.703 1.733
San Francisco 1.187 1.131 0.808
St Louis 3.413 2.379 2.357
Governor 0.818 0.840 0.919
Vicechair 0.954 0.975 1.106
Untrimmed Mean 0.960 1.036 0.974
Mean of Trimmed 0.899 1.098 0.949
Vect Trimmed Mean 1.003 0.914 0.893
Greenbook 1.139 0.697 0.978
SPF 1.365
UNEMP
Trimmed Mean 0.410 0.289 0.070
Atlanta 0.668 0.844 0.811
Boston 1.407 0.992 1.337
Chicago 0.818 1.358 0.952
Cleveland 0.981 1.128 1.389
Dallas 0.988 0.943 1.013
Kansas City 1.187 1.205 0.831
Minneapolis 1.103 0.795 1.621
New York 1.321 1.239 1.550
Philadelphia 0.986 1.239 1.241
Richmond 0.724 0.874 0.547
San Francisco 1.128 0.992 1.682
St Louis 0.922 0.849 1.378
Governor 1.317 1.039 1.277
Vicechair 1.065 0.622 1.398
Untrimmed Mean 1.008 1.024 0.979
Mean of Trimmed 1.027 1.067 0.947
Vect Trimmed Mean 0.967 1.010 1.000
Greenbook 1.420 1.061 1.763
SPF 0.959
Notes:
(i) Values associated with the trimmed mean are mean square errors. The remaining values are ratios of MSEs relative to that of the trimmed
mean.
33Table 8: Impact of Individual's Disagreement on Forecast Error Square of CPI
17-month 10-month 5-month
Disagreement in Disagreement in Disagreement in
CPI NGDP CPI NGDP CPI NGDP
V (1) 0:389 0:450 0:225 0:278 0:115 0:078
(0:145) (0:120) (0:060) (0:087) (0:034) (0:036)
RB (2) 0:276 0:160 0:037 0:061 0:110 0:179
(0:161) (0:141) (0:097) (0:086) (0:040) (0:055)
RB  V (3)  0:147 0:149 0:027  0:104  0:143  0:151
(0:280) (0:281) (0:141) (0:138) (0:075) (0:078)
V  D (1) 0:042  0:048  0:033  0:093 0:010 0:066
(0:138) (0:115) (0:038) (0:071) (0:041) (0:052)
RB  D (2) 0:541 0:598 0:406 0:373 0:094 0:008
(0:256) (0:198) (0:155) (0:132) (0:057) (0:056)
RB  V  D (3)  0:364  0:626  0:336  0:177 0:003 0:001
(0:305) (0:289) (0:164) (0:178) (0:098) (0:085)
Regional Voter 0:219  0:075 0:038 0:103 0:107 0:074
p-value (1 + 2 + 3 = 0) 0:175 0:740 0:618 0:342 0:185 0:116
R.Voter vs. R.Non-Voter  0:322  0:673  0:368  0:270 0:013 0:067
p-value (1 + 2 + 3   [2] = 0) 0:238 0:012 0:023 0:101 0:882 0:324
Gov. vs. R.Voter  0:177 0:027  0:070  0:196  0:097  0:008
p-value (1   [1 + 2 + 3] = 0) 0:405 0:914 0:408 0:133 0:287 0:906
Gov. vs. R.Non-Voter  0:499  0:646  0:439  0:465  0:084 0:058
p-value (1   2 = 0) 0:089 0:006 0:007 0:002 0:237 0:449
Adj. R2 0:462 0:461 0:459 0:396 0:508 0:489
N 119 119 120 120 119 119
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) Each column represents one regression model.
34Table 9: Mean Disagreement by Dissent
Mean p-value
Assenters vs. Non-voters vs.
Assenters Dissenters Non-voters Dissenters Dissenters
17-month
Vector 1.821 1.835 1.867 0:957 0:904
NGDP 0.702 0.900 0.847 0:509 0:859
RGDP 0.659 1.050 0.827 0:135 0:393
CPI 0.745 0.740 0.724 0:988 0:961
UNEMP 0.784 0.673 0.799 0:596 0:539
5-month
Vector 1.732 2.127 1.922 0:280 0:579
NGDP 0.712 1.043 0.799 0:199 0:329
RGDP 0.686 0.916 0.797 0:573 0:772
CPI 0.792 0.987 0.800 0:324 0:383
UNEMP 0.699 1.218 0.770 0:029 0:079
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(ii) No dissent in 10-month forecast (February).
35Appendix Tables
36Table 1-A: Median Disagreement by Horizon
Mean p-value
17-month 10-month 5-month 17m vs. 10m 10m vs. 5m 17h vs. 5m
Vector 4:800 5:069 4:844 0:540 0:600 0:914
NGDP 1:335 1:285 1:364 0:753 0:638 0:870
RGDP 1:143 1:259 1:838 0:439 0:023 0:007
CPI 1:434 1:451 1:075 0:940 0:043 0:048
UNEMP 1:300 1:144 1:217 0:297 0:661 0:621
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(ii) Mean multivariate disagreement is calculated by averaging over all individuals' level of disagreement using
equation (4). The scalar measures of disagreement were constructed similarly using equation (3).
37Table 2-A: Median Disagreement by Voting Status
Mean p-value
Voters ex.
Voters Voters vs. NY/G vs.
Voters Nonvoters ex. NY/G Nonvoters Nonvoters
Vector
17-month 4.585 5.118 4.706 0.281 0:507
10-month 4.994 5.182 5.025 0.773 0:829
5-month 4.633 5.158 4.780 0.308 0:536
Total 4.738 5.153 4.839 0.196 0:401
Nominal GDP
17-month 1.222 1.503 1.317 0.222 0:485
10-month 1.250 1.337 1.324 0.706 0:961
5-month 1.282 1.486 1.636 0.370 0:665
Total 1.252 1.442 1.424 0.147 0:917
Real GDP
17-month 1.072 1.249 0.888 0.404 0:162
10-month 1.303 1.192 1.628 0.591 0:083
5-month 1.813 1.875 1.509 0.887 0:416
Total 1.396 1.439 1.345 0.807 0:626
CPI
17-month 1.448 1.414 1.714 0.905 0:376
10-month 1.326 1.639 1.363 0.331 0:484
5-month 0.996 1.191 1.174 0.317 0:936
Total 1.257 1.414 1.416 0.319 0:991
Unemployment
17-month 1.228 1.406 1.262 0.416 0:587
10-month 1.231 1.012 0.947 0.273 0:775
5-month 1.148 1.319 1.071 0.533 0:447
Total 1.202 1.246 1.092 0.749 0:324
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively.
(ii) Mean multivariate disagreement is calculated by averaging over all individuals' level
of disagreement using equation (4). The scalar measures of disagreement were con-
structed similarly using equation (3).
38Table 3-A: Median Multivariate Disagreement by Individual
Mean p-value
Voter vs. Agg. Agg. vs.
Aggregate Voters Non-voters Non-voters vs. Gov. Vice-chair
Atlanta 3.930 3.082 4.269 0:058 0:142 0:912
Boston 4.156 3.589 4.582 0:101 0:271 0:637
Chicago 4.429 4.715 4.215 0:585 0:492 0:326
Cleveland 7.125 6.426 8.324 0:323 0:018 0:003
Dallas 4.517 5.337 4.107 0:192 0:690 0:362
Kansas City 4.499 4.167 4.749 0:532 0:594 0:283
Minneapolis 5.621 3.623 6.420 0:035 0:346 0:068
New York 4.117 4.117 0:225 0:672
Philadelphia 4.335 3.761 4.564 0:292 0:310 0:354
Richmond 4.229 5.041 3.904 0:335 0:404 0:608
San Francisco 3.715 3.332 3.868 0:340 0:009 0:764
St Louis 9.042 7.957 9.857 0:309 0:000 0:000
Governor 4.780 4.780 0:024
Vice-chair 3.859 3.859
Total 4.905 4.738 5.153 0:401 0:611 0:007
Notes:
(i) ***, **, and * denote statistical signiance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 5-A: Median Disagreement of SPF and FOMC
SPF FOMC Voters Nonvoters Regional Governors
Vector 6.032 3.691 3.735 3.617 3.689 3.695
NGDP 1.510 0.974 0.962 0.993 0.939 1.061
RGDP 1.903 1.008 1.040 0.957 1.004 1.020
CPI 1.502 1.064 1.005 1.162 1.144 0.863
UNEMP 1.670 0.881 0.953 0.762 0.849 0.961
Notes:
(i) Mean multivariate disagreement is calculated by averaging over all individuals' level of
disagreement using equation (4). The scalar measures of disagreement were constructed
similarly using equation (3).
41